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JOINT VENTURES—ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CREATES A
BROADER DEFINITION OF JOINT VENTURES
Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519

I.

FACTS

In May 1996, Joedy Bragg, Frank Haughton, William LaCrosse, and
Monte Sandvick purchased three oil and gas leases in Golden Valley
County, North Dakota.1 The oil and gas leases, known as the Horn Leases,
were standard, paid-up leases with terms of five years.2 The leases
contained no provision for extension or renewal.3 LaCrosse owned Empire
Oil Company, which held record title to the leases.4 The parties purchased
the leases through their credits in the Empire Oil Company JV checking
account.5
In addition to the Horn Leases, the parties developed relationships with
one another through previously owned oil and gas leases.6 Bragg and Sandvick alleged that the parties discussed extending the original Horn Leases
upon their expiration.7 However, Haughton and LaCrosse claimed that
such conversations never occurred.8 In November 2000, Haughton and LaCrosse purchased three oil and gas leases on the same Golden Valley
County property.9 These leases were known as the Horn Top Leases and
were to be leased at the expiration of the Horn Leases, as they covered the
same acreage.10 Before purchasing the Horn Top Leases, Haughton and LaCrosse twice offered to purchase Bragg and Sandvick’s interests in the
Horn Leases, but Bragg and Sandvick refused.11

1. Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, ¶ 2, 747 N.W.2d 519, 520.
2. Sandvick, ¶ 2, 747 N.W.2d at 520.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 3.
7. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519
(No. 20070146).
8. Brief for Defendants-Appellee at 5, Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519
(No. 20070146).
9. Sandvick, ¶ 4, 747 N.W.2d at 520.
10. Id. at 521.
11. Id.
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In 2004, Bragg and Sandvick sued Haughton and LaCrosse under partnership law, claiming that they breached their fiduciary duties by not offering Bragg and Sandvick an opportunity to purchase the Horn Top Leases.12
While the parties agreed that they shared profits, losses, and expenses, no
written document established a partnership or joint venture relationship.13
But Bragg and Sandvick claimed that they had orally agreed to form a partnership relationship, and argued that oral agreements, rather than written
agreements, are customary in the oil and gas industry.14 The district court
found in favor of Haughton and LaCrosse and held that no partnership or
joint venture existed.15 Bragg and Sandvick appealed the district court’s
judgment.16
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.17
The court held that while there was no partnership relationship, a joint
venture relationship existed.18 Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme
Court found that Haughton and LaCrosse breached their fiduciary duties.19
The Sandvick court remanded the case to address and determine damages.20
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Sandvick v. LaCrosse21 implicates various areas of law including top
leases and the differences between partnership and joint venture relationships.22 First, partnership relationships are examined. Joint venture
relationships are then discussed. Next, the fiduciary duties of partnerships
and joint ventures are analyzed. Finally, top leases are explained.
A. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF PARTNERSHIPS
General partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited liability partnerships are three types of partnership relationships.23 Most partnerships are
12. Id. ¶ 5, 747 N.W.2d at 521.
13. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that there was no written document).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 17.
16. Sandvick, ¶ 1, 747 N.W.2d at 520.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. ¶ 20, 747 N.W.2d at 524.
21. 2008 ND 77, 747 N.W.2d 519.
22. See discussion infra Parts II.A-D (analyzing partnerships, joint ventures, fiduciary duties,
and top leases).
23. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-2 (explaining general partnership law, as well as North
Dakota partnership law); see also JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND, UNDERSTANDING PARTNERSHIP AND
LLC TAXATION 11 (2d ed. 2003) (listing and defining the common types of partnerships). A
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general partnerships.24 General partnership law provides common concepts
of partnership law that are essential in understanding most partnership relationships.25 Therefore, general partnership relationships are discussed first.
General partnerships are then examined in the context of North Dakota law.
1.

Overview of General Partnership Law

The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) is the foremost guide for partnership law.26 Today, most practitioners and commentators use a revised version of the UPA.27 The UPA rules focus on the relationships among partners as well as the relationships between partnerships and third parties.28
The original UPA defined a partnership as “an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”29 The revised
UPA (RUPA) states that “the association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the
persons intend to form a partnership.”30 While no exclusive test is used to
determine the existence of a partnership, parties are considered to be partners when they agree, by their acts, conduct, or an agreement, that they intend to carry on as co-owners of a business and share in profits, losses, and
expenses.31

limited partnership must have two or more parties. Id. At least one of the partners involved in the
limited partnership must be a general partner and one must be a limited partner. Id. In limited
partnerships, the general partner has unlimited personal liability, while the limited partner is only
liable for the amount he or she invested into the limited partnership. Id. A limited liability
partnership is a partnership in which the partners are not personally liable for certain partnership
debts. Id. Liability differs from state to state, but in limited liability partnerships, a partner is
usually only personally liable when he or she has acted negligently or committed wrongful
conduct. Id.
24. FRIEDLAND, supra note 23, at 10.
25. See id. (discussing general partnership law).
26. DAVID S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND LLCS 190 (2d ed. 2002); see
discussion infra Parts II.A.2 (analyzing North Dakota partnership law); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT Prefatory Note 1, 1 (1997) [hereinafter Prefatory Note]. Developing a uniform law of
partnership was first considered in 1902. Id. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws originally developed the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) in 1914.
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 190. The UPA provided guidelines for general partnerships and
limited partnerships. Prefatory Note, supra note 26, at 1. The UPA was adopted in all states, with
the exception of Louisiana. Id.
27. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 190; Prefatory Note, supra note 26, at 1-2. In 1987, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) decided to begin revisions on the UPA. Id. at 1. In 1992, the NCCUSL adopted a revised version of the UPA. Id. The
NCCUSL again revised the UPA and adopted a new version in 1994, 1996, and 1997.
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 1, 190. While the NCCUSL refers to each version as the UPA,
many practitioners refer to the revised act as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA). Id.
28. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 191.
29. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1) (1914); see KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 193.
30. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997); see KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 193.
31. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 193-94.
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Partnerships are usually classified into three types: partnerships at will,
partnerships for a term, and partnerships for a particular undertaking.32
When parties are involved in a partnership at will, any party is entitled to
end the partnership at any time, even without cause.33 If the parties are involved in a partnership for a term, they are in an agreement to be in the
partnership for a specified time.34 Finally, if the parties are involved in a
partnership for a particular undertaking, the partnership ends when the specific task or goal is complete.35 The goal or task is usually specified in the
partnership agreement.36
In Estate of Zimmerman,37 which involved a spouse’s property in an
augmented estate, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that uniform laws,
such as the revised UPA, are used in a uniform manner; this means that
courts can and should consult other jurisdictions that have adopted the uniform statutes when interpreting the statute’s meaning.38 However, the court
also explained that it has the authority to use decisions from other states in
order to further interpret the law.39 Therefore, in the following section,
North Dakota partnership law is examined, as the North Dakota Supreme
Court’s interpretation of partnership law is important to understand.40
2.

North Dakota Partnership Law

In 1995, North Dakota adopted the revised UPA.41 The North Dakota
Century Code, using the revised UPA’s definition, identified partnership as
“an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit.”42 Although North Dakota has adopted the revised UPA, the following sections further examine basic partnership concepts in the context of
North Dakota law.43 First, the definition of a North Dakota partnership is
discussed. The elements of a North Dakota partnership are then explained.
Finally, the standard of review for a North Dakota partnership is examined.

32. Id. at 198.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 2001 ND 155, 633 N.W.2d. 594.
38. Estate of Zimmerman, ¶ 14, 633 N.W.2d at 599.
39. Id.
40. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2 (analyzing North Dakota partnership law).
41. Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275 (citing Uniform Partnership
Act § 202, cmt. 1 (1997)).
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-01(19) (2007).
43. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2.a-c (defining terms, explaining elements, and discussing
the standard of review for a North Dakota partnership).
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Definition of a Partnership

The North Dakota Supreme Court has defined partnership in many
cases.44 While the court uses the definition provided in the revised UPA,
North Dakota case law has further construed the North Dakota Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the definition.45 This section reviews North Dakota cases that provide the North Dakota Supreme Court’s analysis of the
definition of a partnership.46
In Gangl v. Gangl,47 the parties brought an action involving a family
farming relationship.48 Anton Gangl, the plaintiff, alleged that the parties
had a working arrangement that was equivalent to a partnership, and that
the assets of their arrangement should be divided among the parties.49 The
district court held that no partnership existed because Gangl failed to
establish evidence to show that one existed.50 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the decision.51
The Gangl court used the North Dakota Century Code definition of
partnership and further illustrated how to prove the existence of a partnership.52 The Gangl court first established that one specific test is not used to
determine whether a partnership exists.53 Instead, the determination is
based on the facts and circumstances of each case.54 However, the Gangl
court suggested that, with the statutory definition, specific elements are important when determining the existence of a partnership.55 The court clarified three essential elements in showing a partnership exists: (1) an association, or an intention to be partners; (2) co-ownership and a community
of interest in the business; and (3) a profit motive.56 Through Gangl, the
North Dakota Supreme Court established the groundwork for the definition

44. See, e.g., Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1979) (quoting the North Dakota
Century Code).
45. See, e.g,, Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d 444, 446 (discussing
North Dakota’s interpretation of the definition of partnership).
46. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2.a (discussing the definition of partnership through North
Dakota case law).
47. 281 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1979).
48. Gangl, 281 N.W 2d. at 576.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 579 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-05-06(4) (repealed 1995)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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of a partnership.57 The court has further developed the definition of a
partnership in later cases.58
In Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky,59 Edward Tarnavsky, the plaintiff, argued
that the lower court erred when it did not find that a partnership or business
arrangement existed between he and his brother, Morris Tarnavsky.60
Edward and Morris ranched and farmed together under an informal
arrangement.61 Edward sued Morris and claimed that their informal arrangement was a partnership.62 Edward sought “dissolution and an accounting of partnership profits and assets.”63 However, Morris denied that
their arrangement was a partnership and counterclaimed for payments he
claimed he had made on behalf of Edward, in order to satisfy a previous
federal court judgment.64 The trial court ruled in favor of Morris and held
that no partnership existed because Edward was unable to establish coownership.65 Edward appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it
did not find a partnership.66 Additionally, Edward argued that he was
entitled to some partnership assets that Morris had prevented him from
obtaining.67
In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court again looked to the
North Dakota Century Code to define partnership.68 Similarly to Gangl, the
court held that three essential elements of partnership exist: (1) intent to be
partners; (2) co-ownership of the business; and (3) profit motive.69 Because
Edward was unable to establish co-ownership of any items of property, and
because he was unable to show intent to create a partnership, the court held
that the evidence did not sufficiently show that a partnership had been
established.70
Through Gangl and Tarnavsky, the North Dakota Supreme Court defined partnership by establishing the critical elements needed to prove the

57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d 444, 446 (interpreting
the definition of partnership).
59. 2003 ND 110, 666 N.W.2d 444.
60. Tarnavsky, ¶ 6, 666 N.W.2d at 446.
61. Id. ¶ 4.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8.
66. Id. ¶ 6.
67. Id.
68. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1979)).
69. Id.; see Gangl, 281 N.W.2d at 579 (N.D. 1979) (reiterating the partnership elements).
70. Tarnavsky, ¶ 8, 666 N.W.2d at 446.
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existence of a partnership.71 Identifying essential elements of a partnership
is important, but discovering what the North Dakota Supreme Court has
found to be adequate in meeting these elements is critical.72 In Ziegler v.
Dahl,73 the North Dakota Supreme Court further articulated the three elements needed to prove the existence of a partnership.74
b.

Elements of a Partnership

In Ziegler, Michael Ziegler and Jack Kirsch claimed that they were in a
partnership relationship with Steve Dahl, David Tronson, and James Legacie.75 Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie marketed an ice fishing guide service on
Devils Lake in 1997, after the completion of the 1996-1997 ice fishing season.76 While the three shared clients and marketing expenses, they agreed
to work as independent contractors and to obtain their own licenses and
equipment.77 Near the end of the 1998-1999 ice fishing season, Dahl asked
Ziegler and Kirsch to assist in guiding.78 After the completion of the 1999
ice fishing season, the parties orally agreed that each party would receive
his payments from different clients.79 Additionally, the parties each wrote a
check to Dahl for $813.97.80 Ziegler and Kirsch later claimed that the
checks were for an initial capital investment, while Dahl claimed they were
for future marketing expenses.81 In 2000, Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie
continued to guide under the name Perch Patrol.82 However, Dahl,
Tronson, and Legacie informed Ziegler and Kirsch that Ziegler and Kirsch
could no longer guide with Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie.83 The district court
granted a motion for summary judgment dismissing Ziegler and Kirsch’s
claim that they were in a partnership with Dahl, Tronson, and Legacie.84
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, based on the finding that

71. Id. ¶ 7; Gangl, 281 N.W.2d at 579.
72. See Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275-78 (identifying and
explaining the elements of a North Dakota partnership).
73. 2005 ND 10, 691 N.W.2d 271.
74. Ziegler, ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78.
75. Id. ¶ 1, 691 N.W.2d at 273.
76. Id. ¶ 2.
77. Id.
78. Id. ¶ 3.
79. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
80. Id. ¶ 6.
81. Id.
82. Id. ¶ 7, 691 N.W.2d at 274.
83. Id.
84. Id. ¶ 8.
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Ziegler and Kirsch were unable to show that the first two partnership
elements existed in their relationship with the defendants.85
Ziegler illustrated that establishing each partnership element is imperative to prove the existence of a partnership.86 The following sections explain each of the essential elements in establishing a partnership under
North Dakota law. First, the element of intent is explained. Next, coownership is discussed. Finally, the profit motive element is examined.
i.

Intent by Partners

Ziegler stated that demonstrating intent to form a partnership is one of
the most important steps in proving the existence of a partnership.87 In
1995, North Dakota adopted the revised UPA’s definition, which added the
phrase, “whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership,” to the
existing definition.88 This language informs parties that they could become
partners by demonstrating intent through their actions alone, even if they
explicitly stated that their relationship was not a partnership.89
In Gangl, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the requisite intent is met when the different parties want to work together and be a part of
a relationship that includes the other essential elements required of a partnership.90 So long as parties aim to work together in a co-ownership
relationship with the sharing of profits, the element of intent is met.91 The
court further emphasized that intent is not something that must be stated
outright.92 Therefore, if intent is shown through the actions of the parties,
parties cannot simply state that they are not involved in a partnership, they
must show it.93 A partnership can only exist if there is a form of intent
among the parties.94 However, in order to completely establish the existence of a partnership, the elements of co-ownership and profit motive are
required as well.95

85. Id. ¶ 27, 691 N.W.2d at 278.
86. See id. ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78 (demonstrating how the elements must be met in
order to prove a partnership existed).
87. Ziegler, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d at 275.
88. Id.; UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997).
89. Ziegler, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d at 275.
90. Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 580 (N.D. 1979).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ziegler, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d at 275.
95. Id. ¶¶ 21-26, 691 N.W.2d at 277-78.
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Co-Ownership

The second element to prove the existence of a partnership is coownership.96 With co-ownership, parties must prove that they have mutual
control over their business and that they share a community of interest.97 If
a party is able to establish mutual control and a community of interest, the
element of co-ownership is met.98
With co-ownership, the parties involved must have control over their
business.99 Parties are considered co-owners of a business when they share
ultimate control of the enterprise and combine this with profit sharing.100
While control is necessary to show the existence of co-ownership, relinquishing control from the actual parties involved in the co-ownership to associates is acceptable.101
Beyond control, parties must also share a community of interest in the
profits and losses of their business.102 Sharing in the profits of a business is
essential in partnerships.103 Establishing that the partners share in the losses
is equally important.104 Showing that parties shared in the profits and
losses of the business helps establish co-ownership among the parties.105
Co-ownership is an essential element in determining the existence of a partnership.106 Along with co-ownership, though, intent and profit motive must
also exist.107
iii. Profit Motive
The third element to prove the existence of a partnership is profit moTo meet the profit motive requirement, partners must prove that
their business is intended to operate for a profit.109 If the parties are able to
establish that their business was functioning in order to make a profit, the
element is met.110 Profit motive is an essential element to partnership.111
tive.108

96. Id. ¶ 21.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 24, 691 N.W.2d at 277-78.
103. Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 580 (N.D. 1979).
104. Id. at 581.
105. Id. at 580.
106. Ziegler, ¶ 21, 691 N.W.2d at 277.
107. Id. ¶¶ 14-26, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78.
108. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d at 581.
109. Id.
110. Id.; Ziegler, ¶ 26, 691 N.W.2d at 278.
111. Ziegler, ¶ 26, 691 N.W.2d at 278.
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But the other essential elements, intent and co-ownership, must be proven
along with a profit motive to establish a partnership.112
c.

Partnership Standard of Review

Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held that
determining whether a partnership exists is a mixed question of law and
fact.113 However, the final determination, in whether a partnership exists, is
a question of law.114 In J.P. v. Stark County Social Services Board,115
which involved Medicaid payments of out-of-state medical care, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that questions of law are fully reviewable, that
is, de novo review applies.116 Furthermore, in Klein v. Larson,117 where
child custody and child support were at issue, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that when there are questions of fact, the clearly erroneous standard of review applies.118
While partnership law and joint venture law are not identical, they
share many similarities, likely because at one time they were indistinguishable.119 Partnership law has been very influential in the development of
joint venture law.120 Although similar, partnerships and joint ventures are
distinct entities with varying components.121
B. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF JOINT VENTURES
Joint venture relationships are similar to partnerships, but more limited
in scope and duration.122 Understanding common concepts of general joint
venture law, as well as specific interpretations of joint venture law by
states, is important in obtaining a grasp of joint venture law.123 The follow112. Id. ¶¶ 14-24, 691 N.W.2d at 275-78.
113. Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d 444, 446. Mixed questions of
law and fact involve issues that are neither pure questions of fact nor pure questions of law.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (8th ed. 2004). Questions of fact do not involve the law on a
given point; instead, they are required to be resolved by a jury in a jury trial or judge in a bench
trial. Id. at 1281. Questions of law concern the application or interpretation of the law and are
answered by the judge. Id.
114. Tarnavsky, ¶ 7, 666 N.W.2d at 446.
115. 2007 ND 140, 737 N.W.2d 627.
116. J.P., ¶ 9, 737 N.W.2d at 631.
117. 2006 ND 236, 724 N.W.2d 565.
118. Klein, ¶ 35, 724 N.W.2d at 575.
119. Henry W. Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REV. 425, 428 (1950).
120. See SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582 (stating
that partnership law principles apply to joint ventures).
121. Nichols, supra note 119, at 444.
122. SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 582.
123. See Nichols, supra note 119, at 432-33 (describing the common characteristics of joint
venture relationships).
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ing sections explain both the general concepts of joint venture law and the
North Dakota Supreme Court’s interpretation of joint venture law. First,
joint venture relationships are broadly discussed. Next, joint venture relationships are discussed in the context of North Dakota law.
1.

Overview of Joint Venture Law

At common law, joint ventures, a creation of the American court system, were not recognized as an individual entity.124 Instead, they were
identified as informal partnerships.125 While no identified reason of why or
how joint ventures developed, American courts began to recognize joint
ventures and distinguish them from partnerships as early as 1890.126 It was
then that courts began to gradually acknowledge that parties could combine
their property and services without forming an actual partnership.127
Joint venture relationships are typically described as similar to partnerships, without the longevity of a partnership: “[t]he joint venture, also
known as joint adventure, joint enterprise, joint undertaking, joint speculation and syndicate, has been defined as a special combination of two or
more persons who, in some specific venture, seek a profit jointly without
any actual partnership or corporate designation.”128 Courts have generally
stated that joint venture relationships are established when parties undertake
a specific business project with a profit motive.129 Additionally, the parties
involved must have an equal voice regarding the control and management
of the venture.130
No exclusive test is used to establish a joint venture.131 Whether a joint
venture exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as no
rule can be applied to every case.132 In joint venture relationships, a single
factor is not determinative.133 Instead, the facts of each case are examined
as a whole.134 However, courts have determined a number of elements that
generally establish a joint venture: (1) two or more parties must establish a
specific agreement to carry on a venture; (2) parties must show through the
agreement an intention to be joint venturers; (3) parties must each
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Nichols, supra note 119, at 428.
See id. (explaining the history of joint venture entities).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id.
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contribute property, finances, skill, knowledge, or effort to the joint
venture; (4) parties must each have some control over the enterprise; and (5)
parties must share in both the profits and the losses of the enterprise.135
2.

North Dakota Joint Venture Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court more clearly defines the nature of
joint ventures in North Dakota.136 The court’s interpretation of joint venture law will be developed throughout the following sections. First, the
definition of a joint venture is discussed. Then the elements of a joint venture are analyzed. Finally, the standard of review for joint ventures is
examined.
a.

Definition of a Joint Venture

Historically, North Dakota has recognized joint venture relationships.137 In SPW Associates, LLP v. Anderson,138 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that joint ventures are very similar to partnerships, but
more limited in scope and duration.139 Additionally, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has stated there is no definite way to determine the
existence of a joint venture.140 While each case depends on its respective
facts, the North Dakota Supreme Court has indicated that particular
elements are very influential when establishing a joint venture.141
Consequently, understanding the factors relied upon by the North Dakota
Supreme Court provides crucial insights into the determination of a joint
venture relationship.142
b.

Elements of a Joint Venture

In Voltz v. Dudgeon,143 James Dudgeon appealed from a judgment for
Jeffrey Voltz.144 In 1978, Voltz, a farmer, purchased a truck through his
business, Voltz Trucking, in order to haul grain.145 Voltz hired Dudgeon to
135. Id.
136. See SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582 (explaining the North Dakota Supreme Court’s interpretation of joint ventures).
137. See, e.g., SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 582 (“North Dakota has historically
recognized the joint venture relationship.”).
138. 2006 ND 159, 718 N.W.2d 580.
139. SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 582.
140. Id. ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583; Voltz v. Dudgeon, 334 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 1983).
141. SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583; Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206.
142. See Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206 (defining the elements of a joint venture).
143. 334 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1983).
144. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 205.
145. Id.

2009]

CASE COMMENT

481

transport the grain and the two later decided that they could make more
money with an additional truck.146 Voltz Trucking purchased another truck,
and both Voltz and Dudgeon signed the purchase agreement.147 Dudgeon
maintained the second truck and oversaw the bills for the truck maintenance.148 Dudgeon was also authorized to write checks and even withdraw
his compensation from the account.149 After Voltz Trucking purchased the
second truck, the first truck was in an accident and was not operable, which
left Voltz Trucking with only one truck.150 But after a discrepancy regarding the serial numbers of the second truck, the truck had to be returned to
the seller, leaving Voltz Trucking with no trucks.151 Voltz brought an action against Dudgeon.152 He claimed that because of the partnership between the two men, Dudgeon was responsible for half of the trucking business expenses.153 The district court found that a joint venture, not a
partnership, existed between the parties.154 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the decision.155
The Voltz court elaborated on the elements of the long-recognized joint
venture relationship.156 Because the court had never specifically defined
the elements needed to show a joint venture relationship, it summarized
elements that the Minnesota Supreme Court used in what was considered a
generally accepted rule.157 The court provided four elements that it found
necessary to establish a joint venture relationship: (1) contribution; (2) joint
proprietorship and control; (3) sharing of profits, but not necessarily losses;
and (4) a contract.158 The court also held that a business enterprise must be
limited in scope and duration in order to be considered a joint venture.159
In SPW Associates, LLP v. Anderson, Murdo Cameron appealed from a
district court judgment that determined SPW Associates had lawfully
possessed an airplane.160 Cameron, a commercial pilot, was interested in a

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id. (citing Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, 52 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn. 1952)).
Id.
Id.
SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 1, 718 N.W.2d 580, 581.
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vintage airplane.161 After Cameron placed advertisements in aviation
magazines, Douglas Anderson responded.162 The two men entered into a
written agreement to build two airplanes.163 Cameron was responsible for
providing an engine for the first airplane and parts for both airplanes, while
Anderson was in charge of designing and manufacturing different parts for
the airplanes.164 Cameron and Anderson agreed that they would each keep
one of the completed airplanes.165
Anderson later entered into a loan agreement with SPW Associates
through his company, Exclusive Aviation, in order to finance the airplanes.166 Anderson defaulted on the loan and signed an agreement granting possession of the first airplane to SPW Associates.167 Cameron filed a
lien multiple times, and eventually the lien was recorded.168 SPW Associates then sought a declaratory judgment stating that it was entitled to possession of the airplane.169 Cameron argued that his interest in the airplane,
not the security interest of SPW Associates, was superior.170 The district
court found that Anderson and Cameron formed a joint venture relationship.171 Due to this relationship, the district court granted SPW Associates
the security interest in the airplane.172 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed.173
The North Dakota Supreme Court reiterated the elements necessary to
establish a joint venture relationship.174 The court held that four elements
were necessary to show a joint venture relationship.175 The North Dakota
Supreme Court, however, also clarified that no definite formula exists for
identifying a joint venture relationship and the facts of each case control the
decision.176
161. Id. ¶ 2.
162. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
163. Id. ¶ 3, 718 N.W.2d at 581.
164. Id. at 581-82.
165. Id. at 582.
166. Id. ¶ 4.
167. Id. ¶ 5.
168. Id.
169. Id. ¶ 6.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. ¶ 14, 718 N.W.2d at 584.
174. Id. ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583. The court laid out four elements: (1) contribution by the
parties; (2) proprietary interest and right of mutual control; (3) an express or implied agreement
for the sharing of profits, but not necessarily losses; and (4) an express or implied contract showing the formation of a joint venture. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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While the court established that the facts of each particular case are
important, the court also established that certain elements need to be present
for a joint venture relationship to exist.177 The following sections explain
each of the elements essential to establish a joint venture in North Dakota.
First, contribution is analyzed. Next, the requirement of a proprietary
interest and mutual control are discussed. Then, the express or implied
agreement for the sharing of profits is examined. Finally, the express or
implied contract is explored.
i.

Contribution

When establishing that a joint venture relationship existed, parties must
prove contribution among the members of the venture.178 Contribution
shows that the parties involved in the joint venture relationship combined
their money, property, time, or skill.179 In Voltz v. Dudgeon, both parties
contributed, but in different ways.180 While Voltz contributed money to the
venture, Dudgeon contributed his time, skill, knowledge, driving expertise,
and business maintenance.181 Therefore, while parties involved in a joint
venture relationship must show that they each contributed in some way, the
contribution that each party supplied does not necessarily need to be of
equal type or value, as long as all of the parties have contributed.182 Like
the element of contribution, establishing a proprietary interest and mutual
control, an agreement for shared profits, and a contract showing the agreement are also essential elements.183
ii.

Proprietary Interest and Mutual Control

To establish that a joint venture relationship exists, parties must also
show that a proprietary interest and right of mutual control existed over the
joint venture property.184 A proprietary interest is defined as “the interest
held by a property owner together with all appurtenant rights, such as a

177. See generally id. (listing the elements after stating “the following four elements must be
present”); Voltz v. Dudgeon, 334 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 1983) (defining the elements necessary
to prove a joint venture relationship).
178. See Voltz v. Dudgeon 334 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 1983) (defining the meaning of
contribution, with regard to North Dakota joint venture law).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. (listing and defining elements necessary to display a North Dakota joint venture); see also SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d 580, 583 (listing
the elements necessary to display a North Dakota joint venture).
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stockholder’s right to vote the shares.”185 Sharing an economic interest is
an important part in proving a joint venture; however, an economic interest
alone is not sufficient to prove a joint venture.186 Parties must also demonstrate joint control over the venture.187 Once a party has demonstrated that
they had some control in the enterprise, the element of proprietary interest
and mutual control is met.188 Beyond the other required elements, an agreement for shared profits must also be shown to form a joint venture.189
iii. Agreement for Shared Profits
Parties must prove an express or implied agreement, showing that they
intended to share in the profits of the venture.190 The agreement, however,
does not necessarily need to show that the parties intended to share in the
losses of the venture.191 In Voltz v. Dudgeon, no express agreement demonstrated that the parties intended to share in the profits of the trucking
business.192 Dudgeon, however, testified that he expected to share in the
profits.193 Therefore, the court found that although no express agreement
existed, an implied agreement to share in the profits of the business was
present.194 Similarly, in SPW Associates, LLP, the parties did not have an
express agreement to share in the profits of making airplanes.195 However,
because the parties had an agreement to build airplanes and sell them to
third parties, the court found that the parties implied, through their actions
and other agreements, to share in the profits of the venture.196 An agreement to share in profits is essential in establishing a joint venture.197 The
existence of a contract that can show the formation of a joint venture is also
a critical element in the formation of a joint venture.198

185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (8th ed. 2004).
186. See Nichols, supra note 119, at 439 (stating that the joint venturers typically need to
have an equal voice and level of control); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 13 (2006)
(stating that merely sharing an economic interest is not sufficient to form a joint venture).
187. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 13 (2006).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id. (explaining an agreement for shared profits); see SPW Assocs., LLP v.
Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d 580, 583.
192. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 205.
193. Id. at 207.
194. Id.
195. SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 11, 718 N.W.2d at 583.
196. Id. ¶ 12, 718 N.W.2d at 584.
197. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206.
198. Id.
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iv. Contract Showing Joint Venture
To establish a joint venture relationship, parties must show an express
or implied contract to form a joint venture relationship.199 Similar to the
agreement to share profits, the contract that shows that the parties entered
into a joint venture can be either express or implied.200 In Voltz, Dudgeon
argued that there was no contract between the parties even though he had
co-signed a retail installment contract.201 The court, however, held that the
circumstances of the events “indicate[d] a sufficient objective manifestation
of consent” which, in turn, satisfied the implied contract element.202 When
a contract showing the formation of a joint venture is present, along with
evidence of contribution, proprietary interest and mutual control, and an
agreement to share in profits, all of the elements of a joint venture are
met.203
c.

Joint Venture Standard of Review

Determining the existence of a joint venture is a question of fact.204
The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure state, “[f]indings of fact . . .
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.”205 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a finding
of fact is clearly erroneous if: (1) induced by an erroneous view of the law;
(2) no evidence supports the finding; or (3) the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.206
While differences exist between partnerships and joint ventures, such
as their respective standards of review, they also share many similar
qualities.207 For instance, the fiduciary duties that partners and joint
venturers owe to one another are identical.208 Throughout the next section,
these fiduciary duties owed in partnerships and joint ventures are analyzed.

199. See id. (defining the elements needed to show a joint venture relationship in North Dakota); SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583 (listing the elements needed to show a joint
venture relationship in North Dakota).
200. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 206; SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 583.
201. Voltz, 334 N.W.2d at 207.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 206.
204. Id.
205. N.D. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
206. Klein v. Larson, 2006 ND 236, ¶ 6, 724 N.W.2d 565, 567.
207. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that partners
and joint venturers owe one another the same fiduciary duties).
208. Id.
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C. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN PARTNERSHIPS AND JOINT VENTURES
A fiduciary relationship exists when a person is expected to act for the
benefit of another person, in the scope of their relationship.209 Section one
will discuss a background of case law regarding partnership and joint venture fiduciary duties. Section two will then examine the general concepts of
the fiduciary duties for partnerships and joint ventures.
1.

Case Law Regarding Fiduciary Duties

Partners are bound to strict fiduciary duties regarding loyalty and
care.210 Partnership law applies to joint venture relationships.211 Therefore,
joint venture relationships are bound by the same strict fiduciary duties regarding loyalty and care as partnerships.212 The following sections illustrate the great responsibility courts have placed on parties with regard to
fiduciary duties.
a.

General Fiduciary Duty Case Law

In the seminal fiduciary duty case, Meinhard v. Salmon,213 Walter
Salmon leased the Hotel Bristol for twenty years from Louisa Gerry.214
Salmon intended to renovate the building and develop shops and offices at a
cost of $200,000.215 Salmon worked with Morton Meinhard, who provided
funding for the renovations.216 The Court of Appeals of New York considered the relationship between Salmon and Meinhard to be a joint
venture.217
Near the end of the twenty-year lease, Elbridge Gerry became the new
owner of the premises.218 In addition to Hotel Bristol, Gerry owned a
number of buildings in the same area.219 Gerry intended to lease the area
long-term to someone who would destroy and replace the buildings.220
Eventually, Gerry leased the area to Midpoint Realty Company, a company
209. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004).
210. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (1997) (discussing the fiduciary duties owed in
partnership relationships); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04 (2007) (describing the fiduciary duties
owed in partnership relationships).
211. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
212. Id.
213. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
214. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545.
215. Id. at 546.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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controlled by Salmon.221 Salmon did not inform Meinhard of the lease until
it was finalized, which was approximately one month after the signing and
delivery of the lease.222 Meinhard then demanded that the lease be included
in the joint venture’s assets, which would oblige Salmon to share in the
interest of the lease.223 Salmon refused, and a referee then found in favor of
Meinhard, but limited Meinhard’s interest in the lease to twenty-five
percent.224 In a cross-appeal at the appellate division, the court increased
Meinhard’s interest to fifty percent.225 Salmon appealed.226
The New York Court of Appeals held that joint venturers are subject to
the same strict fiduciary duties as partners:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this
court.227
The court found that Salmon excluded Meinhard from the chance to
compete when he chose to keep the new lease a secret.228 While the New
York Court of Appeals held that Salmon was not guilty of a conscious
purpose to defraud, the New York Court of Appeals found that Salmon was
in a position to gain the new lease because of the success of his joint
venture with Meinhard.229 Consequently, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision, but modified the judgment, in order to

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 548.
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designate certain proceeds that Salmon gained from entering the lease to go
to Meinhard.230
Meinard has had a large impact on fiduciary duties owed in both partnership and joint venture relationships.231 Not only did the case demonstrate that a great expectation for loyalty and care exists in joint venture relationships, but it also heightened the level of loyalty and care due in
partnership relationships.232 The court’s words describing the strictness of
fiduciary duties have been quoted both in cases involving partnerships and
joint ventures.233 Many courts, including the North Dakota Supreme Court,
use Meinhard to fully explain the high standard set, in regard to fiduciary
duties.234
b.

North Dakota Fiduciary Duty Case Law

In Svihl v. Gress,235 Albert Svihl alleged that he and George Gress entered into a partnership relationship in order to transport livestock.236 Svihl
claimed that Gress disposed of assets and demanded an accounting for all of
the money and property received by the partnership.237 The district court
held that a partnership existed between Svihl and Gress, and that Svihl was
not entitled to a share of the rental profits for a cattle trailer, which Svihl asserted belonged to the partnership.238 Svihl appealed and claimed that the
district court erred when it held that Svihl was not entitled to a share of the
rent on a partnership-owned cattle trailer.239 Svihl and Gress previously
agreed that no business profits would be disbursed until the partnership paid
off its debts.240 The partnership owed money for the machinery used to
operate the business, and it also owed Gress for the money he advanced in
order to operate the business.241 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that

230. Id. at 549.
231. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 259 (stating that the decision is applicable to both
partnerships and joint ventures).
232. See id. (explaining the importance of the decision in Meinhard).
233. See generally Svihl v. Gress, 216 N.W.2d 110, 115 (N.D. 1974) (quoting Judge Cardozo’s words regarding fiduciary duties in Meinhard).
234. See, e.g., Svihl, 216 N.W.2d at 115 (using Judge Cardozo’s Meinhard decision to illustrate the fiduciary duties owed to partners and joint venturers).
235. 216 N.W.2d 110 (N.D. 1974).
236. Svihl, 216 N.W.2d at 111.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 112.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Svihl was entitled to rental profits from the cattle trailer, but only after
Gress had been fully compensated for his advance to the business.242
The North Dakota Supreme Court used Meinhard to demonstrate the
importance of fiduciary duties in a partnership relationship.243 The court
held that the fiduciary duties, with regard to partnership assets, were
significant, because those who choose to enter into a fiduciary relationship
must be held to a higher standard in regard to their partnership
relationships.244 The court also held that partners owe one another the
duties of good faith and integrity in their partnership dealings.245
2.

General Concepts of Fiduciary Duties

Partners owe the partnership and their partners the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care.246 The duties cannot be removed through a partnership
agreement.247 However, the partnership agreement may determine how the
partnership plans to measure the performance of the duties, so long as the
determination is not unreasonable.248
In Grynberg v. Dome Petroleum Corp.,249 a case that involved a
farmout agreement and fiduciary duties, the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated “[t]he existence and scope of a fiduciary duty depends upon the
language of the parties’ agreement.”250 The UPA states fiduciary duties
that are relevant in partnership relationships.251 The North Dakota Century
Code uses the same language in identifying the fiduciary duties of a
partnership.252 While these laws are discussed in the context of partnership
relationships, remembering that the principles of partnership laws apply to
joint venture relationships is important.253 In the following section, the
duty of loyalty owed in a partnership relationship is discussed. Finally, the
duty of care owed in a partnership relationship is examined.

242. Id. at 120.
243. Id. at 115 (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Engstrom v. Larson, 55 N.W.2d 579, 587 (N.D. 1952)).
246. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(a) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(1) (2007).
247. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3), (4) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-1303(2)(c-d) (2007); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 1 (1997).
248. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-1303(2)(c) (2007); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 1 (1997).
249. 1999 ND 167, 599 N.W.2d 261.
250. Grynberg, ¶ 21, 599 N.W.2d at 267.
251. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (1997); see also § 45-16-04 (showing North Dakota’s language in regard to fiduciary duties).
252. See § 45-16-04 (displaying identical language regarding partnerships).
253. See SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582 (explaining how the principles of partnership law apply to joint ventures).
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Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty is essential in a partnership relationship.254 The
purpose of the duty of loyalty is to prevent individual partners from profiting at the expense of the partnership.255 UPA section 404(b) outlines the
areas of partnerships where a duty of loyalty is owed:
A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners
is limited to the following:
1. to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner or partnership property,
including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
2. to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on
behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and
3. to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before the dissolution of
the partnership.256
These three areas encompass the entire duty of loyalty that is owed in a
partnership relationship.257
UPA section 404(b)(1) discusses the duty of loyalty in the context of
business opportunities.258 The provision limits the duty of loyalty in two
ways.259 First, the section requires that the partners involved in a partnership avoid any opportunities, without consent from the other partners,
which would allow them to use the partnership property for their own personal gain.260 Second, the provision requires individual partners to avoid
taking business opportunities from which the partnership may benefit.261
But the second section of the provision may be eliminated if all of the partners agree.262 Additionally, if an opportunity arises and the partnership
254. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 1.
255. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 261.
256. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b); see also § 45-16-04(2) (noting the identical language present in the UPA).
257. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 2.
258. Id. § 404(b)(1) (1997); see also § 45-16-04(2)(a) (showing the corresponding section of
North Dakota partnership law).
259. Id. § 404(b)(1) (1997); see also § 45-16-04(2)(a).
260. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 263.
261. Id. at 262.
262. Id. at 263.
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wholly decides to pass, the individual partners may then take the opportunities for themselves.263
UPA section 404(b)(2) prevents partners from operating as, or on
behalf of, a party that has an adverse interest to the partnership.264 A
conflict of interest exists when a partner has agreed to allow the partnership
to participate in business with a partner, a partner’s family member, an
organization in which the partner has financial interest, or any person whose
interests are adverse to the partnership.265 These relationships lead to a
conflict of interest, which is considered a breach of the duty of loyalty.266
UPA section 404(b)(3) requires partners to avoid competing with the
partnership before the dissolution of the partnership.267 As soon as the partnership dissolution occurs, the individual partners may again compete.268
However, the partners are not able to use confidential information gained
from the partnership after the dissolution.269
To remedy violations of UPA section 404(b), the partners who
breached the provision are required to reimburse the partnership.270 If a
partner violates UPA section 404(b), he or she is required to give any profits gained through his or her violation to the partnership.271 While a
partnership is not required to prove damages in these cases, if the
partnership can, it may then bring an additional suit to compensate those
damages.272 This duty of loyalty, as well as a duty of care, is owed to partners in partner relationships.273
b.

Duty of Care

The duty of care among partners is limited to “refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a
knowing violation of law.”274 In explaining the duty of care, comment
three to UPA section 404 states, “[t]he standard of care imposed by RUPA
is that of gross negligence.”275 While partners have a duty to avoid gross
263. Id.
264. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 2 (1997).
265. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 263.
266. Id. at 264.
267. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b)(3); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(2)(c)
(2007) (articulating North Dakota’s fiduciary requirement of partners).
268. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 2.
269. Id.
270. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 264.
271. Id. at 261.
272. Id. at 264.
273. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 3.
274. N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(3) (2007).
275. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt. 3.
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negligence, partners are not liable to the partnership for common mistakes.276 Under the revised UPA, the duty of care cannot be eliminated
from a partnership.277 While the standard of care can be limited, the standard cannot be “unreasonably reduce[d].”278
Fiduciary duties play a large role in both partnership and joint venture
relationships.279 As partnership law applies to joint ventures, joint
venturers are bound to the same stringent fiduciary duties as partners.280
Therefore, partners and joint venturers should be aware of the possible
liabilities they will face if fiduciary duties are breached.281
D. TOP LEASES
A top lease is an oil and gas lease.282 In Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc.
v. Petex, Inc.,283 which involved oil and gas lease extensions, the Kansas
Supreme Court cited Williams and Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms,
to define “top lease” as “an oil and gas lease granted by a landowner during
the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to become effective if
and when the existing lease expires or is terminated.”284 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has also applied this definition when explaining top
leases.285
In Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co.,286 the North Dakota Supreme Court
discussed top leasing.287 The court stated that while top leasing was once
discouraged and considered to be similar to claim jumping, it is now
considered useful.288 Top leasing is now seen as functional because a top
lease increases drilling and competitiveness among oil lessees.289 If a
current lease, also known as a bottom lease, is topped, the owner of the
bottom lease will likely drill on the land in order to prevent losing the

276. KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 258.
277. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(4); § 404, cmt. 3.
278. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(4).
279. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
280. Id.
281. See id. (discussing the importance of fiduciary duties in both partnerships and joint
ventures).
282. Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc. v. Petex, Inc., 1 P.3d 909, 914 (Kan. 2000).
283. 1 P.3d 909 (Kan. 2000).
284. Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc., 1 P.3d at 914.
285. Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 657 n.1 (N.D. 1986).
286. 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986).
287. Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 659.
288. Id.
289. Nelson Roach, The Rule Against Perpetuities: The Validity of Oil and Gas Top Leases
and Top Deeds in Texas After Peveto v. Starkey, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 399, 409 (1983).
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lease.290 Additionally, top leasing allows smaller oil companies to compete
with larger oil companies in heavily leased areas.291 Therefore, top leasing
plays a large role in the development of areas with an abundance of oil.292
The North Dakota Supreme Court, along with many other courts, has
examined top leases, as well as partnership and joint venture relationships.293 With partnership and joint venture relationships, the court has
established specific elements that are essential in showing the formation of
each entity.294 Additionally, courts have determined the fiduciary duties for
both of these relationships and discussed the heightened responsibility of
loyalty and care that partners and joint venturers owe to one another.295
The North Dakota Supreme Court used its past decisions regarding partnerships, joint ventures, fiduciary duties, and top leases to decide Sandvick v.
Lacrosse in 2008.296
III. ANALYSIS
In Sandvick v. LaCrosse, Justice Sandstrom wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Maring.297 The Honorable
Bruce E. Bohlman, who sat in place of Justice Kapsner, also joined the
majority.298 Justice Crothers concurred in part and dissented in part.299 In
reversing the district court’s decision, the majority found that a joint venture relationship existed between the parties, but that a partnership relationship did not.300 Additionally, the majority held that Haughton and LaCrosse owed Bragg and Sandvick damages because Haughton and
LaCrosse breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty.301 The dissent agreed
with the majority that a partnership did not exist, but dissented as to the
majority’s joint venture determination and fiduciary duty findings.302

290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id. (discussing top leasing).
293. See Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1979) (defining partnership under the
North Dakota Century Code); see also SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718
N.W.2d 580, 582 (defining joint venture).
294. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶¶ 13-26, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275-78 (identifying
and explaining the elements of a North Dakota partnership); Voltz v. Dudgeon, 334 N.W.2d 204,
206 (N.D. 1983) (defining the elements of a joint venture).
295. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
296. See discussion infra Part III (analyzing Sandvick).
297. Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, ¶¶ 1, 22, 747N.W.2d 519, 520, 524.
298. Id. ¶ 23, 747 N.W.2d at 524.
299. Id. (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 747 N.W.2d at 522, 523.
301. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20, 747 N.W.2d at 524.
302. Id. ¶ 24 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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A. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority first discussed how to establish a partnership, and then
determined that one did not exist between Bragg, Haughton, LaCrosse, and
Sandvick.303 The majority then analyzed joint venture relationships and
held that one did exist between the parties.304 Finally, the majority discussed the fiduciary duties of joint venturers and found that Haughton and
LaCrosse breached their duties of loyalty and care.305 With regard to the
breach of fiduciary duties, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
Haughton and LaCrosse owed damages to Bragg and Sandvick.306
1.

Determination of Partnership

First, the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed what constituted a
partnership under North Dakota law.307 The court referenced Tarnavsky
and held that the elements of a partnership are: (1) the intention to be partners; (2) co-ownership of the business; and (3) a profit motive.308 The court
then discussed the standard of review that should be used to determine the
existence of partnerships.309 The court quoted Tarnavsky and stated that the
existence of a partnership is a mixed question of law and fact.310 Ultimately, the court stated that existence of a partnership is a question of law,
and that questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal.311
The court then discussed the district court’s decision.312 The district
court held that the parties did not co-own a business.313 Also, the district
court determined that the business the parties were involved in was limited
because their relationship was confined to their involvement in the Horn
Leases.314 Furthermore, the district court found that the Horn Leases were
only for a set period of time, and therefore were limited to that specific time
period.315

303. Id. ¶¶ 7-10, 747 N.W.2d at 521-22.
304. Id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23.
305. Id. ¶¶ 14-19, 747 N.W.2d at 523-24.
306. Id. ¶ 20, 747 N.W.2d at 524.
307. Id. ¶¶ 7-10, 747 N.W.2d at 521-22.
308. Id. ¶ 7, 747 N.W.2d at 521 (citing Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 2003 ND 110, ¶ 7, 666
N.W.2d 444, 446).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. ¶ 8.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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Next, the Sandvick court discussed the revised UPA and its history in
North Dakota.316 The court stated that it has the option to examine comments of the revised UPA, which North Dakota adopted in 1995, in order to
interpret the intent of the drafters.317 Therefore, when a conflict or
misinterpretation occurs, the court has the ability to review the comments
and understand the intent of the statutory language.318
Finally, the court analyzed the facts of the case in order to determine if
a partnership existed.319 The court discussed that the parties entered the
leases for a specific amount of time, that they intended to sell the leases,
and that the parties were involved in numerous similar enterprises with different parties.320 These factors proved influential and displayed that they
did not intend to be involved with one another by means of a partnership.321
The Sandvick court concluded that the district court did not err, and that no
partnership existed between the parties, because the Horn Leases constituted one act, not a series of acts.322
2.

Determination of Joint Venture

The North Dakota Supreme Court then analyzed what constituted a
joint venture in North Dakota.323 The court stated that joint venture
relationships are similar to partnerships, but are more limited in scope and
duration.324 The court also acknowledged that the laws of partnerships apply to joint ventures.325 The court laid out the four elements needed to
show that a joint venture exists: (1) contribution; (2) proprietary interest
and the right of mutual control; (3) an express or implied agreement for
sharing of profits, but not necessarily losses; and (4) an express or implied
contract showing the formation of a joint venture.326 However, the court
also stated that there is not a set method to determine the existence of a joint
venture, as each case is dependent on the facts.327

316. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Ziegler v. Dahl, 2005 ND 10, ¶ 14, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. ¶ 10, 747 N.W.2d at 521-22.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 522.
322. Id.
323. Id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (citing SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND
159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582).
324. Id. ¶ 11, 747 N.W.2d at 522 (citing SPW Assocs., LLP, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 582).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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After the court discussed the background of joint ventures in North
Dakota, it reviewed the district court findings regarding the existence of a
joint venture.328 The district court held that a joint venture did not exist.329
The district court also found that an agreement between Bragg and Haughton or LaCrosse about the purchase of future leases did not exist.330
Additionally, no written or oral agreement was found between Sandvick
and Haughton or LaCrosse concerning a new lease.331 Furthermore, when
the Horn Leases were purchased, no agreement between Bragg and
Haughton or LaCrosse about the lease development existed.332 In fact, no
agreement was shown that made Bragg or Sandvick a part of any future
leases.333 No agreement was established between the parties that limited
them in any way, with regard to other similar projects.334 Beyond that,
none of the parties involved in the Horn Leases intended to work exclusively with one another, a fact well-known among those involved.335 Finally, none of the individuals involved expected that the others would include them in their other business projects.336
The Sandvick court also discussed some of the other findings made by
the district court.337 The district court found that the parties had a checking
account entitled “Empire Oil JV Account,” that the leases were purchased
from their equal contributions, that the leases’ title was held under the
Empire Oil Company’s name, and that the parties intended to sell the
leases.338 These findings, along with the testimony of Bragg, Haughton,
and LaCrosse that stated the parties intended to share in the profits,
persuaded the North Dakota Supreme Court to determine that a joint
venture existed between the parties.339

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. ¶ 12, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523.
Id.
Id.
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Determination of Fiduciary Duties

Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the fiduciary duties
required in joint venture relationships in North Dakota.340 The court stated
that fiduciary duties can be owed in different ways, depending on the
agreement between the parties.341 The court also held that partnership law
is applicable to joint ventures.342
The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the North Dakota Century
Code, which states that partners owe one another the duty of loyalty and
care.343 The court described the duty of loyalty by using the North Dakota
Century Code and previous court decisions, such as Meinhard and Svihl.344
The Sandvick court then discussed the purchase of the original Horn Leases
in comparison to the purchase of the Horn Top Leases.345 The court determined that an important difference between the two purchases was the fact
that Bragg and Sandvick were unaware of Haughton and LaCrosse’s attainment of the Horn Top Leases.346 The court found that Haughton and
LaCrosse created a conflict of interest when they purchased the Horn Top
Leases without informing Bragg and Sandvick of the purchase.347
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that purchasing the
Horn Top Leases was not in the best interest of the joint venture because of
the underlying joint venture in the original Horn Leases.348 The court
reasoned that because Bragg and Sandvick were deliberately left out of the
attainment of the Horn Top Leases, Haughton and LaCrosse breached their
fiduciary duties of loyalty.349 The Sandvick court remanded the case in
order to determine the amount of damages that Bragg and Sandvick should
receive.350 The court further instructed the district court to limit damages to
the revenue generated from oil production on the land where the Horn
leases existed.351 While the court found that a joint venture existed between
340. Id. ¶¶ 14-19, 747 N.W.2d at 523-24.
341. Id. ¶ 14, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (citing Grynberg v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 1999 ND 167,
¶ 21, 599 N.W.2d 261, 267).
342. Id. (citing SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 2006 ND 159, ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 580, 582).
343. Id. ¶ 15 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-16-04(1) (2007)).
344. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Svihl v. Gress, 216 N.W.2d 110, 115 (N.D. 1974); Meinhard v. Salmon,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
345. Id. ¶ 17, 747 N.W.2d at 523-24.
346. Id. at 524.
347. Id. ¶ 19.
348. Id.
349. Id. (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928)).
350. Id. ¶ 20.
351. Id.
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Bragg, Haughton, LaCrosse, and Sandvick and that Haughton and LaCrosse
breached the fiduciary duties that they owed to Bragg and Sandvick, Justice
Crothers dissented in regard to these specific holdings.352
B. JUSTICE CROTHERS’S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Crothers concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority opinion.353 Justice Crothers’ concurred with the majority’s holding
that a partnership did not exist in this case.354 Justice Crothers’s dissent discussed the process of finding a joint venture and argued that the district
court’s decision should have been affirmed.355 Justice Crothers claimed
that the majority disregarded the clearly erroneous standard of review and
instead took over the district court’s fact-finding role when it chose to set
aside the district court’s findings.356 Justice Crothers argued that the majority overlooked the district court’s findings of fact and instead concluded
that a joint venture existed based on facts that the majority found more persuasive.357 Justice Crothers recognized that there was no written contract
between the parties, that the scope of the enterprise was unclear, and that
the district court made many findings that demonstrated the improbability
of a joint venture relationship.358
Additionally, Justice Crothers stated that even if the facts that the majority determined persuasive did constitute a joint venture, the majority
erred by presuming that the parties did not limit their duty of loyalty, so
long as the limitation is not unreasonable.359 Justice Crothers stated that in
North Dakota, partners, and therefore joint venturers, are allowed to limit
their duty of loyalty.360 Further, Justice Crothers argued that North Dakota
does allow for the limitation of the duty of loyalty.361 With that, Justice
Crothers stated that when the majority assumed that the full amount of
loyalty existed, it failed to determine whether a loyalty limitation occurred
among the parties.362

352. Id. ¶ 24 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
353. Id. ¶ 23.
354. Id. ¶ 24.
355. Id.
356. Id. ¶ 26, 747 N.W.2d at 525 (citing Klein v. Larson, 2006 ND 236, ¶ 35, 724 N.W.2d
565, 575 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
357. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26, 747 N.W.2d at 524-25.
358. Id. ¶ 28, 747 N.W.2d at 525.
359. Id. ¶ 27 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-03(2) (2007)).
360. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-03(2) (2007)).
361. Id. ¶ 27.
362. Id.
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Justice Crothers concluded that the standard of review necessary for
finding joint venture relationships required the court to allow the district
court to be the fact-finder.363 Additionally, Justice Crothers argued that
when determining the fiduciary duties, the majority failed to discuss
whether the duty of loyalty could have been limited by the parties.364 While
Justice Crothers concurred with the majority’s determination that a
partnership did not exist, Justice Crothers dissented from the majority’s
holding that found a joint venture existed and fiduciary duties were
breached.365
IV. IMPACT
In Sandvick v. LaCrosse, the North Dakota Supreme Court broadened
the definition of a joint venture.366 In its decision, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a joint venture existed, even when all of the
elements of a joint venture were not shown.367 The Sandvick holding will
likely affect those parties who do not intend to enter into joint venture
relationships and the courts that determine whether joint venture relationships exist.368
Currently, North Dakota oil and gas projects are booming.369 A
significant amount of oil has is being developed in western North
Dakota.370 With that, many agreements are being made and many business
ventures are developing.371 Sandvick will likely impact these agreements,
because of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s broad definition of a joint
venture.372 Parties are strictly obligated to one another in these types of
relationships, because the principles of partnership law, including fiduciary
duties, do apply to joint venturers.373 As a result of the court’s broadening
of the definition of a joint venture, more parties will likely be involved in

363. Id. ¶ 28, 747 N.W.2d at 526.
364. Id. ¶ 27, 747 N.W.2d at 525.
365. Id. ¶¶ 13, 28, 747 N.W.2d at 523, 525.
366. See id. ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523.
367. Id.
368. See id.
369. Dale Wetzel, Soaring Oil Production to get Another Boost, GRAND FORKS HERALD,
Nov. 9, 2009, at A1.
370. Id. The Bakken oil formation covers parts of North Dakota, Montana, and southeastern
Saskatchewan. Id. There is an estimated 271-503 billion barrels of oil located in this formation.
Id.
371. Id.
372. See Sandvick, ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (discussing the process by which the
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a joint venture existed).
373. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (articulating the strict fiduciary duties that are owed in partnerships and joint ventures).
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these types of relationships and, consequently, more people will owe these
stringent fiduciary duties.374 Amidst the development of oil and gas
projects, Sandvick should, and most likely will, impact the way people
conduct business in North Dakota.375
Although entering into partnerships and joint ventures without knowledge has been possible for parties in the past, the North Dakota Supreme
Court made it much easier for parties to establish the formation of a joint
venture by concluding that a joint venture existed without finding an
agreement or contract.376 Those who desire to purchase an oil lease without
the desire to commit themselves to a business entity, must be especially
careful when forming relationships to lease land and mineral interests.377
To avoid unknowingly entering into joint venture relationships, parties need
to do more than state that they are not involved in a joint venture relationship.378 While voicing that a joint venture does not exist may be indicative
of non-formation, a mere statement, that is, magic words, will not be sufficient to determine the existence of a joint venture.379 The court will look to
the actions of the parties, not simply the words exchanged.380 Therefore, to
avoid the possibility of unknowingly forming a joint venture relationship,
those who do not want to be a part of a joint venture must be careful not to
allow any indication that could be interpreted as an affiliation with another
person or group.381
Furthermore, North Dakota district courts are now obligated to follow
the North Dakota Supreme Court’s holding, and joint venture relationships

374. See Sandvick, ¶¶ 11-19, 747 N.W.2d at 522-24 (noting that broadening the scope of
joint venture relationships increases the likelihood of more joint ventures).
375. See id., ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (discussing the process by which the North
Dakota Supreme Court determined that a joint venture existed); Jerome R. Corsi, Billions of Gallons of Oil in North Dakota, Montana Geological Survey Calls Fine Largest Reserves Outside
Alaska, WORLDNETDAILY, Apr. 13, 2008, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?
fa=PAGE.view&pageId=61488 (last visited July 15, 2009) (discussing the Bakken Formation and
its potential impact on North Dakota).
376. See Sandvick, ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (noting that the absence of an agreement or contract will not preclude the recognition of a joint venture relationship).
377. See id. (displaying that a joint venture can exist even when elements essential to a joint
venture are not met).
378. See Nichols, supra note 119, at 435 (explaining that joint venture relationships can be
formed without a written agreement, so long as some type of intent can be inferred).
379. See id. at 434 (displaying that the court will look to both the words and the actions of
the parties when determining intent).
380. See id. (establishing that a court will not only look to the words exchanged, but also the
actions of the parties).
381. See id. at 434-35 (discussing what the court will look to when determining whether intent to form a joint venture exists).
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will likely be found to exist in more circumstances.382 By looking at these
relationships in such a broad way, the Sandvick court seemed to blur the
line between where a joint venture relationship existed and where it did
not.383 The vagueness surrounding the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
determination of a joint venture relationship will likely result in increased
litigation, because more relationships will fit under this broad joint venture
definition.384
Sandvick will affect many people in North Dakota.385 In broadening
the definition of a joint venture, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that joint venture relationships may be more easily established.386
Sandvick should impact the way people conduct business in North Dakota,
especially with the increasing possibility of numerous parties entering into
arrangements in the development of the oil and gas industry.387
V. CONCLUSION
In Sandvick, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a partnership
relationship was not present between the parties, but that a joint venture relationship existed.388 The North Dakota Supreme Court mentioned the district court’s findings with regard to Sandvick, but determined different facts
were more significant.389 Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court
defined the elements necessary to establish a joint venture.390 However,
when certain elements were not met and the North Dakota Supreme Court
still found that a joint venture was established, the North Dakota Supreme
Court blurred the lines between the existence and non-existence of a joint

382. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (8th ed. 2004). Binding precedent is defined as
“[a] precedent that a court must follow. For example, a lower court is bound by an applicable
holding of a higher court in the same jurisdiction.” Id.
383. See Sandvick, ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (holding that a joint venture existed when all of
the elements were not met).
384. See id. (holding that a joint venture existed when all of the elements were not met).
385. See Sandvick, ¶ 13, 747 N.W.2d at 523 (holding that a joint venture did not exist and
thus illustrating that the court has developed a more broad definition of joint venture which will
likely affect more North Dakotans).
386. See id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (discussing the process in which the North
Dakota Supreme Court determined that a joint venture existed).
387. Id.; see Corsi supra note 375 (articulating on the vast amount of oil found in North
Dakota).
388. Sandvick, ¶ 1, 747 N.W.2d at 520.
389. See id. ¶¶ 12-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23.
390. Id. ¶ 11, 747 N.W.2d at 522.
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venture.391 This decision will likely influence future determinations of joint
venture relationships, as well as future business transactions regarding oil
and gas leases in North Dakota.392
Kelly E. Olson∗

391. See id. ¶¶ 11-13, 747 N.W.2d at 522-23 (holding that a joint venture existed).
392. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing the impact that Sandvick could have on North
Dakota).
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